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Abstract 
In their recent work Thomas S. Schelling (2007, 2010), reiterating original arguments about 
game theory and its applications to social sciences. In particular, game theory helps to explore 
situations in which agents make decisions interdependent (strategic communication). Schelling's 
originality is to extend economic theory to social sciences. When a player can anticipate the 
options and influence the decisions of others. The strategy, indirect communication plays a 
crucial role. To illustrate, we investigate how to perform the payoff matrix in cases of bribery 
and threat 
 
Introduction 
Quite often people prefer indirect forms of communication to make direct 
communication, examples ranging from expressions slightly suggestive about sex, 
veiled threats, or bribes humble requests in the shade. The forms of indirect 
communication are to a large extent the very structure of our everyday relationships and 
set up a good understanding about what others think or believe. In other words, beyond 
everyday experience indirect communication makes up different forms of 
communication related to the rational strategy in fields as suggestive as international 
relations, the threat of war, diplomacy or the games in casinos.  
Based on Schelling (1960), we propose two issues related to indirect communication, on 
the central idea that human communication incorporates the relationship between 
negotiation and conflict
2
. First, the acts of indirect communication, opens up 
possibilities for negotiation between someone who proposes and another who accepts or 
rejects. An audience can accept what he recommended and can react with restraint and 
criticize. Furthermore, this intuition is based on the conventional game theory, which 
                                                             
1 Professor, Center for Research and Special Projects CIPE, Faculty of Finance, Government and 
International Relations, Externado University of Colombia (persuacion@gmail.com) this work represents 
an extension to testing Thomas S. Shelling (1960) and Steven Pinker (2007). Especially chapter 8: 
"Games People Play", where the author develops an extensive commentary with examples to the theory 
of indirect speech acts of Paul Grice. The group's research exercises that address have been directed to 
explore the ideas of Thomas Schelling. The author explains how you set up a theory of indirect 
communication as part of the strategy in the conflict and negotiation. The author wishes to thank the 
members of the seminar Strategy of Conflict (second half of 2008). María Fernanda Guerrero Pereira, 
María Leonor Hernández Porras, María Natalia Díaz Rozo.  
2 Schelling TC (1960)  The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (Versión al 
español de Adolfo Martín, La Estrategia del Conflicto, Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, 1964).   
predicts that the costs and benefits may arise directly or indirectly from the tender
3
. In 
other words, communication can be understood as a rational negotiation where we 
discuss the means and ends between a speaker and his audience.  
Second, language has two functions: to communicate information, and negotiate the 
relationship between speaker and audience where he goes (reciprocity and common 
domain). Moreover, the emotional costs of a mismatch in the relationship can press the 
need for plausible deniability and, (omit), people care what he says even if no tangible 
costs (Estrada, 2007a). On one side, people perceive language as a medium that allows 
you to use common phrases to create knowledge and send a message with fidelity 
language can serve to point in coordination games. This feature makes direct requests 
from various hints; he and his listeners can deduct the rest as an intention which can be 
trusted
4
.  
After the introduction (1) This article comprises the following divisions: (2) indirect 
communication relates to the theory of strategy and conflict negotiation, (3) presents the 
perspective of strategic communication in Thomas Schelling, ( 4) are introduced the 
components of bribery and nonlinear functions of the action of bribe, (5) described the 
threat as a strategy, its rationale and its psychological aspects, (6) gives some 
concluding comments, (7) presents an annotated bibliography that can serve the reader 
to continue the discussion line, (8) presents a general bibliography of texts used in the 
workplace.  
 
2. Indirect communication as a strategy  
Indirect communication plays a strategic role par excellence. It was originally 
developed within an area of significant actions. A speaker addresses the audience 
argumentative indicating what they believe or think. The reactions of the audience only 
have (in principle) with these proposals. The key to the indirect action is that the 
intention of the speaker no reflection on the communicative act. The ambiguity of the 
speaker affects the meanings to your words. The result, the strategy of indirect 
communication can be kept depending on the dynamics of conditions involving the 
speaker and the audience (Estrada, 2007b).  
 
 
 
                                                             
3 Schelling wrote his book partly motivated by their perception of the limited nature of mathematical 
language (used by Neumann and Nash) to represent a whole decisive factors involved in game theory (cf. 
Von Neumann, 107 n, 139, 314 n, 330; Nash, 117 n, 136,147,295 n, 299  in the Spanish edition). 
4
 Tullera, Jantzena and Jirsaa, presented a study to discover the conditions of learning a second, “A 
dynamical approach to speech categorization Two routes to learning” New Ideas in Psychology 26 (2008) 
208–226. 
One example is in the strategic position of President Uribe on his second reelection 
 
 
 
The grace of the cartoon is its track record of the phenomenon of indirect 
communication. He keeps about to back to his arguments than explicit. So even if your 
intention is not necessarily fool the audience, a second alternative retains rationally 
invisible. The communicative act may keep up the conditions of reliability between the 
parties, if the audience accepts the premises of the speaker. And we could conceive in 
the audience interest in keeping down reserve the speaker's original intentions
5
. But 
while not rectified the original intention, the indirect communication allows 
relationships are maintained within this strategic area (Estrada, 2004).  
Indeed, quite often people do not communicate directly, but conceals his intentions by 
innuendo, euphemisms and phrases in both directions
6
. We know some examples:  
 
                                                             
5 A set of bibliographic support the basic assumptions that underpin: Rhétorique et Philosophie. Pour une 
théorie de l´argumentation en philosophie. In collaboration avec L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. Préf. De É. 
Bréhier. Paris. P.UF., Boblithéque de Philosophie contemporaine, 1952. (Reimp.2003) 161 p. Contient les 
articles n° 21,24,25,28,29,30,32,38; Traité de l´argumentation. La Novelle Rhetoriqué, en collaboration 
avez L. Olbrechz-Tyteca. Paris. P.U.F., Collection Logos. 2 vol., 1958, 734 p.; 2 éd. 1970, Editions de 
l´Institut de Sociologie. Université de Bruxelles, collection Sociologie genérale et philosophie sociale; 3 
éd. 1976, Éditions de l´Université de Bruxelles, I vol., 734 p. (Julia Sevilla Munóz, Tratado de la 
Argumentación, La Nueva Retórica, Editorial Gredos, S.A., Madrid, 1989., 855 p.); L´Empire rhétorique 
– Rhétorique et Argumentation. Paris. J. Vrin, Collection “Pour Demain”. 1977. 193 p. (Adolfo León 
Gómez Giraldo, El imperio retórico, Retórica y Argumentación, Editorial Norma, 1997, 214 p.); 
Numerous studies have been dedicated in honor of Chaim Perelman and the Theory of Argumentation: La 
nouvelle rhétorique, essais en hommage a Chaim Perelman, Revue Internationales de Philosophie, N° 
127 – 128, 1979., 385 p. ; Langaje, Argumentation et Pedagogie, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, N° 
155, 1985 – fasc. 4., 476 p. Otros libros y artículos., Apostel, leo. “Rhetórique, psico-sociologie et 
logique”. En: Logique et Analyse (Nouvelle Serie) N° 21 –24. 1963.; “What is the force of an argument?” 
En: Revue Internationale de Philosophie N° 127 –128. 1979. Gómez, Adolfo León. El primado de la 
razón práctica, Universidad del Valle, Cali, 1983. Grice, H. Paul. “Logic and conversation”. En: Syntax 
and Semantics vol. III, Speech Acts. Ed. By P. Cole and JL. Morgan, Academic Press, 1975. Se cita 
frecuentemente la versión francesa de Michel Bozon y Fréderic Berthet, en la revista Communications N° 
30. 1979. Noorden, Sally van. “Rhétorique arguments et exigence premiére”, En Revue Internationale 
Philosophie N° 127 – 128., 1979. Wright, George H. Von. Un ensayo de lógica deóntica y la teoría 
general de la acción. Cuadernos de la UNAM, México, 1978. 
 
6 Pinker S (2007) The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature (Viking, New York). 
Beto, El Espectador, 15/09/08 
• Would you like to know my apartment? [Sexual invitation]  
• A marvel! Pass me the butter [gentle request]  
• Will continue in Uraba?, Sorry for your family! [Threat]  
• We count on you to lift Armero [grant application]  
• Coca growers give their contributions in these areas [bribe]  
 
These phenomena raise a puzzle that is among the field of strategic studies and 
philosophy of language. Indirect communication is inefficient and risky seemingly 
unnecessary (with one literal expression could say the same thing). However, as the 
politeness and other forms of communication, indirect communication tends to become 
universal in the domains of practical life. We all learn to play this game, as those who 
are offended not. The attractive character of the forms of indirect communication is the 
phenomena to the types of behavior by people who use it. Consequently, in practical life 
indirect communication operates as seemingly superficial have to show preferences, 
stereotypes, irony and sarcasm
7
. Although there has been little thought on the 
mechanisms that make it effective, this is part of our goal.  
Indirect communication is of much importance in the domain of computer language, 
understanding of programming systems or new forms of communication such as email. 
Words such as "What do you say?" Or "Do you know ...?  Have not we assumed the 
direct nature? Forms of talk in diplomatic communication that can be taken as bilateral 
attacks are structured on indirect communication mechanisms. A complimentary 
expression may become the occasion for demand or "treason." Such as a dinner 
invitation might read as a friendly call, extortion or sexual harassment.  
The way information is presented an increase of the probabilities of winning in a 
conflict negotiation. According to Schelling (1960) the obvious result of the agreements 
will depend largely on how it is stated the problem, what analogies or precedents in the 
memory raises the definition of the issue to negotiate and the kind of data that can be 
used in it. Therefore, people recognize the strategic advantages that can take an indirect 
communication in the Gricean sense.  
Indeed, indirect communication is part of the strategic games of bounded rationality. In 
different circumstances human beings should act recursively to communicate with 
limited conditions everything we think. Or suffer from gaps and inconsistencies in 
communication. So that others can accept these limitations. Although, indirect 
communication increases the several possible outcomes of a strategy of conflict and also 
facilitates the possibility to withdraw before a choice.  
                                                             
7 Brown P, Levinson SC (1987) Politeness: Some Universalism Language Usage, Cambridge University 
Press, New York. 
 2. The prospect of Schelling 
For over 50 forms of indirect communication has been studied by linguists, 
philosophers and psycholinguistics, and the processes by which rational agents hide 
their intentions are well documented, however, the reasons why people take part in 
these strategies concealment (as opposed to directive speech acts) is opening a broad 
portfolio of opportunities. From this perspective, Schelling applies some reasoning of 
evolutionary biology and his own vision of game theory to understand the potential 
strategic advantages of indirect communication: 
 
Many very interesting tactics and game situations depend on the structure of 
communication, particularly of asymmetries in communication and unilateral options to 
start communication or destroy it. Threats are fruitless unless they can be communicated 
to persons to whom they are addressed, the extortion need a way to send knowledge 
from the alternatives of the chosen victim. Even the threat "stop mourn, or I'll give you 
every reason to cry" is ineffective if the child is crying too high to hear it. (Sometimes it 
seems that the children know). A witness can not be intimidated to make him give false 
testimony if he is under surveillance to avoid receiving instructions on what to say, but 
could deduct the penalty of the same threat. (Schelling, 1960) 
 
In the event, the highlights various aspects of indirect communication (1) The link 
established in the threat, with the aim of constraining the behavior of the victim depends 
on the inequality in the first conditions (2) The effective nature of the communication 
live in areas undercover (3) The threat may be unsuccessful due to the nature of 
communication. The analogy used by Schelling is powerfully convincing: a threat is not 
understood as a "threat" if the representation their in the communication, it reaches the 
recipient. 
Theory of indirect communication emphasize that human communication is a practice 
of cooperation, a conversation in which participants have the common goal of an 
efficient exchange of information according to the influential theory of P. Grice. The 
contributions of Grice to the logic of indirect communication mark a decisive shift in 
the logical structure - semantics of it. In a complementary perspective, Thomas 
Schelling, relying on advances in biology, holds that most social relationships are a 
dialectical relationship between cooperation and conflict. Furthermore, this idea is no 
less applicable to the communication offensive actions between enemies and, indeed, 
has found signs that animals exploit manipulation cooperative relationships for 
information exchange. 
In the case of the human species, we could consider the threats (an offer he can not 
refuse), or dangerous secrets (with programs to protect witnesses), leakage of pollution 
(sealed bids or clinical trials), questions recriminatory (for which a response could be 
harmful) in which case you prefer to remain silent or resort to the law of ignorance. The 
very existence in the language of indirect actions suggests that such accusations implied 
are in the game dynamics of human communication. 
In cases of strict cooperation, we expect maximum efficiency in the rumors of 
conspiracy, in cases of conflict; the expectation strains the minds if there is silence. The 
complexity of the codes of communication that characterize the strategic language, are a 
mix of cooperation and conflict. Specifically, this conclusion is reinforced by taking 
into account that most practical applications of indirect communication (diplomacy, 
extortion, bribery and sexual harassment) have their place in conflict settings. 
Indirect communication can take many forms, including gestures of solidarity and 
deference. The phenomenon of stress is related to the address you are taking 
registrations indirect speech acts. Everything will depend on the gradual evolution (or 
reverse) to go find agreements participants. A high sense of affection will need only 
slight movements of the foot under the table or a gentle slope of the eyelids, so 
everything is ready. In particular, the anger felt by a jealous rage may be exposed, 
initially; with color intensity it takes to face up to a description novel about the outbreak 
caused by the crash of a fist against the glass window. 
Indirect communication can also be used to refuse the fulfillment of commitments or 
promises. In terms of Schelling: "the promise is a commitment to the other party 
involved in a negotiation, and is necessary if the last action of any of the negotiators is 
beyond the control of another." In effect, in the promise are fairly enforced the 
conditions into the future by the performer. However, the agent can make use of indirect 
communication to make ambiguous the terms of the promise. 
Schelling suggests important considerations that may apply to communicative 
exchanges with greater subtlety that relationships cost / benefit. The first aspect relates 
to the logic of plausible deniability. In a case of bribery of a police appeal to a veil of 
innocence is intuitively clear: if some officials are corrupt and accept bribes, but others 
are honest, the possibility of detention of those who bribe is present. For this purpose, 
the fact is that in rare circumstances, the police cooperate with the subtleties of 
communication evening proposed by the driver. With this purpose in mind, a game 
theorist relatively simple can delineate the circumstances hints that might give an ideal 
solution to such problems. 
The second aspect of indirect communication as a strategy binds us to games software 
present in social circumstances where no penalties are imposed on tangible, in terms of 
costs and benefits, for tipping the waiter of the restaurant to hasten care, or an invitation 
sex after dinner. Unlike the driver and the officer, the bidder does not incur financial 
penalties by the partner who refuses. Therefore, so the key issue in these cases is to seek 
the reasons that proponents resort to innuendo or calculation of benefits in various 
scenarios. 
There are also scenarios where people use indirect communication when the degree of 
uncertainty about the intentions of others is low, either because the valuation of the 
other is low (the proponent has a high self-esteem), or because the listener is awake and 
can pick up signals from the proponent with reasonable confidence, why in such cases, 
a proposal subtly evening is preferable to a direct and clear? In synthesis, the answer 
should refer to some properties manifest in their own language, as opposed to the 
processes of inference social that enable the interpretation of the hints. 
 
3. Bribery 
Consider the possibility of a bidder whose intervention is due to Grice's Maxims on 
effective communication, precise, correct, direct and relevant. This depends in turn on 
the prominence of some element of coordination or so-called Schelling’s focal points. 
Namely, the proponent has passed a red light and considers how to bribe the traffic 
police. Your choice is between remaining silent or the police propose a $ 25 dollars. 
Unfortunately, the driver does not know if the official is corrupt and accept bribes or 
whether it is honest and stop him for attempted bribery. This is a theoretical game 
where an agent's dilemma is not knowing the values they play with others. Certainly, 
just the property of Thomas Schelling's contribution to game theory is to have 
illuminated the details of such dilemmas. The benefits and potential field are described 
in the following graph: 
 
                                                      Police honest              Police deshonest 
Does not bribe Penalty Penalty 
Bribe Is free Arrested for bribery 
Bribery involved Is free Penalty 
 
 
 
 
Profits in the third row are to combine the advantages of bribing a dishonest police with 
the advantage, not relatively small bribe an honest cop. In these circumstances indirect 
communication is the most rational option. Note that this analysis is incompatible with 
the conventional interpretation that makes indirect speech acts in games of pure 
cooperation. Again, the driver in this case does not use indirect communication to help 
the honest cop reach your goal (law enforcement), but rather confuses his mission in 
search of profit.  
Graphyc 1. Situations of bribery 
The intuition that indirect communication is given an ideal strategy can be confirmed by 
a basic model of rational briber. It is estimated that the costs of bribery are derived from 
(i) the amount of honest, q, (ii) the cost of bribes, Co (iii) the cost of the subpoena, C1, 
(which must be greater than cost of bribery) (iv) the cost of arrest for bribery, C2, 
(which must exceed the cost of the summons), and a crucial psychological variable (v) 
the probability p that the official interpreter of relatively straightforward statement, d, as 
trying to bribery.  
The direct speech is a semantic variable that corresponds to the degree of vagueness of 
the proposition (number of readings) and the amount of these readings are most closely 
related to a bribe than an innocent remark. A proposition of if-then: "If you let me go, I 
will give 50", is more straightforward than the question: "Is there any way out of this 
mess?” And a generic comment: "I've learned my lesson, do not worry you will not be 
repeated," is even less direct (in practical terms, p, can be derived empirically, asking 
people their degree of confidence because a particular phrase seems a bribe).  
Finally, the purpose of indirect communication is to influence the reaction to the 
proposal, to a point or final solution in which no party is expected to remove the other, 
building on the main ingredient of what one believes the other expected to wait for the 
first, and so on. The trend can be observed on the basis of the decision, L, which 
monotonically relates to the likelihood that the police do not interpret the directness of 
the proposition. By placing the, it is estimated that the cost of a driver facing a corrupt 
cop would yc _c0 p _ c1 (1 _ p), while the cost when confronted with an honest cop 
would h c1 _ c2 _ p (1 _ p), in total, costs for the driver are and yh _ c2 p _ c1 (1 _ p), 
 
Another part of indirect communication as a strategy is related to factors that justify 
certain preferential out of tight spots. In truth, humans use tactics of attenuation or 
restriction against what they said or how and why they acted so. It is, according to 
Schelling:  
In a series of tactical maneuvering consists in the ability and opportunity to avoid 
embarrassing efforts ... making the result depends only on the choice of the other party 
". The key is to stop communicating under stress "the question of who should make the 
final decision (Schelling, 1960)  
 
The tactic in such cases as is part of the strategy of transferring responsibility to the 
opponent.  
Now if both honest and corrupt police officers share a linear function L on the decision 
and (omit) have the same decision L for any proposition p, the optimal level of direct 
communication is determined by the percentage of staff honest. If we have q _ (c1_ c0)/ 
(c2 _ c0), the optimal strategy for the driver would not try to bribe them all: d _ 0. If the 
percentage of honest officers is less than the critical threshold, then the optimal strategy 
would be to try the driver unequivocally bribery, d _ 1. In this model, indirect 
communication would not be seen as the optimal strategy. The reason is obvious 
because the cost of the functions have a linear behavior  
For the indirect bribe is an advantage for the driver, the function must be nonlinear. This 
can occur if both the honest and the dishonest officials make decisions L h nonlinear, 
and probability functions p, are derived directly from the bribery (d) whether for the two 
types of decision, the functions are different. That is, although honest and dishonest 
officers interpret indirect communication the same way and therefore have the same 
measure of "hint" as bribery, honest cop hesitate more to stop the driver that the 
dishonest police, about the implications can have the information as part of the burden 
of proof. In general, costs for the driver are:  
y = q {C2 Lh (d) + C1 [1  Lh (d)]} + (1 – q . {C0 Lc (d) + C1 [1 – Lc (d)]} 
 
The case of Lh  y Lc  are functions on the table shows that Figure 2. The anticipated costs 
for the driver are: 
y = C1 si d < dc 
y = qc1 + (1 – q) C0 si dc < d <dh 
y = qc2 + (1 – q) C0 si dh < d 
 
In the intermediate region, dc, d, dh, the costs will be less for the driver and, therefore, 
direct communication would be an ideal level. These results confirm that there are 
circumstances in which the indirect communication is an optimal strategy, formally 
applied the concept of plausible deniability. 
The result depends on the officials but the decision rules of Lh and Lc and the stages of 
carrying out the duties. Formal systems and semantic rules synthetically contribute to 
extrapolate the above arguments. While corrupt officials have a lower threshold reason 
that honest, that is Lh (d) Lc (d) with significant intervals of time, it is easy to show that 
within a range of parameters, the values obtained are minimal with respect to d, between 
the limits of absolute silence and take direct responsibility and without additives.  
It should be stressed also cases where threshold limits are distributed between the two 
types of police officers. Another possible extension to life is a sequence of direct or 
indirect communications that allow probing the inclinations of the officer: "What a 
morning so splendid, that sentence, Agent and know I have to pay for the mistake, I 
greatly admire the ability to work you have, can be another way to solve this problem 
without subpoenas?  
 
It should be noted, the dynamics between these variables are developed in a scenario 
where the influence that "public pressure seems to force the participants to a solution 
obviously, just or reasonable, by way of pressure and how it acts on the participants. In 
its capacity to coordinate expectations through the power of suggestion, what makes it 
so effective to the public, the preceding or ethical?  
 
What is the most plausible hypothesis for decision functions differentiate between 
honest and dishonest police officers? The answer depends on the determining factors in 
the cost function. Take the honest cop, why did not immediately arrested, who 
expressed veiled bribery in the same way a dishonest officer accepts any bribe? Beyond, 
the reason is that although all drivers make proposals that could be interpreted 
(correctly) as implicit bribes, some honest drivers also argue such proposals as innocent 
observations (this phenomenon is intrinsic to the definition of indirect speech acts), 
thus, arrests may be unsuccessful. Lose concentration in these cases can be costly to the 
officer, facing charges of libel, and to subject the institution to pay punitive damages.  
The costs incurred by honest officials to detain a driver rely, therefore, the percentage of 
drivers to make direct observations of nature in similar situations and incentives to 
punish the people who proposed bribes. Instead, for dishonest staff costs depend on the 
amounts of bribes and the possibilities of being denounced. For this reason, it is 
unlikely that the two decision functions with the same shape. While the case of a 
bribery trial action leads to rationality linear mechanisms in the case of a bribe that uses 
indirect communication, rationality does not run in a linear fashion.  
 
5. Threat  
One of the criticisms of Schelling to the conventional theory of games is their inability 
to explain the conditions of strategy where forms of communication are present in 
everyday life. For instance, happens with indirect information. Indeed, the author 
suggests that game theory other than zero-sum games may have squandered their most 
promising field "to be taken to a too abstract level of analysis" (Schelling, 1960, 141). 
In brief, this level of abstraction exceeds a considerable amount of human experience 
situations where communication systems offer an opportunity to make big changes from 
small subtleties.  
What happens to the stocks subject to intimidation paramilitary groups for long periods 
of time? What conditions generate criminal liability of public officials who are "forced" 
to sign contracts with agents of violence? What model of game theory could correspond 
to situations where one party "has the upper hand?" More importantly, the perspective 
we have emphasized what are the communication mechanisms used for the threat? How 
do you defend the threatened community? What type of key used to defend against the 
imposition of violent force?  
Schelling is concerned with cases that may illustrate the indirect communication in 
everyday situations. Take the example of a man enters a restaurant and threatened with 
a gun to diners talking quietly. If twenty men propose it be overcome, however, the risk 
to them is much. How to choose? They can also promise to refrain from threatening 
retaliation after he caught. However, they can not communicate his threat, such as, do 
not speak the same language, "can not verbally disarm.  
In the context of such questions, Schelling raises an objection to all possibilities of 
communication of the threat, what is the structure of information or communication that 
immune to threats to the dogs, idiots, children, martyrs and fanatics? One seems to 
move less on the design of the media, but on the status held by these people. Since, a 
response should see the character of the incommensurability between different worlds. 
What dogs have in common, idiots, children, martyrs and fanatics? Keeping Schelling's 
analytical matrix can say that "A limited rationality to sort objects in space" or "give a 
time sequence of their actions."  
Indirect communication under conditions of threat is sufficiently problematic aspects. 
To start, an advantage which he plays threat is the surprise of his victims. The primary 
reaction states often triggers deep emotional shock. The threat causes coordination 
failures, can not react to the threat with another threat unless we all agree. The threat 
conditions certain commitments. To explain, in a situation where mass communication 
had originally an indeterminate nature, the threat sets limits between two players. A 
player makes a commitment and the other takes a final decision. The game presents the 
threat of a certain nature.  
The threat presents another distinctive feature. One person says that in a particular 
contingency which will obviously rather not do if there were such a contingency, which 
depends on the other side. In summa, this is an indirect communication in which the 
determinants of the action comes from that there is no ambiguity about the message 
hidden implicative carrier. The aim is to test the potential force of violence on the 
victim, i.e. able to prove a power threatening to deliver outstanding results for both 
parties.  
The breadth of choice is limited. And the film is projected on the mind of the victim, 
emphasizing the images of calamity. Indirect communication has discretion in these 
cases the potential force that can use the master agent. Since, although the main aim of 
the threat is a change of behavior of their recipients.  
The threat may coerce their target if he succeeds in communicating some semblance of 
obligation. The obligation is fraught with implications. Schelling says that while the 
compromise sets a course of action, a majority of cases of those who set out, the threat 
sets a course of reaction, suggesting response to another communication. In spite, the 
commitment is a means of obtaining the first move in an exchange in which the first 
movement involves an advantage; the threat is a commitment within a strategy for the 
second movement.  
The analogy with classical mechanics is extremely concise. The principle of action / 
reaction, the phenomena of commitment and threat seem to offer further detail. Only in 
the case of the threat, relied forces tend to cause an obvious imbalance. The victim of 
the threat must give the severity of damage if you breach the obligation. The second 
movement is offset by hidden costs the first move. Generally, the aggressive nature of 
the threat is restricted, if you change your mind that threatens or is unable to comply 
with the action implied there.  
The distinctive character of the threat is reflected by an indirect communication, 
however, must keep its power of intimidation. The threat, or is superfluous and does not 
join a movement, or conveys a genuine and structures related to information and 
communication perfectly distinguishable. Schelling's observation is relevant in this 
regard: "... in fact if, as often happens, the threat is of a nature that the act of 
commitment is not contained in the act statement," if the commitment before the 
communication of the threat or the threat and evidence of its credibility, the first step in 
the process of threat alters the very structure of incentives ... "(Schelling, 1960, 146).  
The key to the effectiveness of the threat is not then in the terminal phase of realization 
of it, but enough to control the means of indirect communication. Are the expectations 
created by the words and the meaning given to the message indirectly that which creates 
the conditions of interdependence to be the victim of the threat with his executioner. 
Over time, the process may be accompanied by evidence of using a force 
The game of strategic moves by Schelling is illustrated with a typical daily life:  
 
The robber who finds that his victim, yet still immensely rich, no money is not over at 
that moment, can not seize his chance unless he can get and hold it hostage while 
awaiting payment, and even that not take effect unless it can find a way to take a 
convincing commitment to return the hostage to a mode that is subject to the possibility 
of an identification or capture (Schelling, 1960, 147)  
 
The situation has two faces the same dilemma. With the first, the robber must overcome 
a situation resulting from the real conditions of his victim, streamlining the procedure to 
be used to do their goals. The second side suggests that the operation itself imposes 
some risk to the offender. Usually, on both sides of the dilemma communication plays a 
central role. The strength of commitment to cause the damage depends on the efficiency 
that has the speech act by threatening.  
A threat is essentially a statement likely to be believed, a conditional choice for the 
second movement. The power comes from intimidation, then the images that are 
communicated in the first movement of the offending agent. In the phrase "this will hurt 
you more than my" made explicit the threat depends on interpersonal utility 
comparisons. The main feature is that the advantage in the first movement depends on 
effective communication and that this strategic advantage, play a decisive role in the 
proposed outcomes for who makes the threat.  
The question is whether we admit that the game has "movements", ie it is possible for 
one player, to or for both together, to undertake in the course of play, actions 
irreversibly alter the game itself, which somehow change the payoff matrix, the order of 
elections or the structure of information in the game. From this point, Schelling 
reevaluates the psychological place to discuss the threat with Luce and Raiffa:  
If a threat is more than information which is intended to draw the attention of 
the other player must ask what else can be. And it must involve some idea of 
commitment-real or fictitious, if it must be something (Schelling, 1960, 149).  
 
This note is comprehensive because it allows us to make two clarifications on the 
originality of Schelling. The first is that the theory of strategy implicitly assumes a 
theory of asymmetric information. The rationale with which each player can maneuver 
the information available is crucial. Second clarification, strategic games, information 
do not flow in a monotonic or linear but operates as a web that has a role of trap. In the 
case of the threat, this means that the information provided encourages direct changes to 
the set of beliefs of the person concerned.  
Pinker argues that threats tend to be ensured in implicatures for two reasons. One is 
familiar, the extortionist not mince words would expose himself, and thus run the risk of 
having to carry legal penalties, like the briber. But it also faces the aim of extortion as 
the challenge brings out his threat. In order to keep up the reputation of living, the 
extortionist would have to carry out the threat, which can be risky and expensive, and it 
does not make sense after that has failed to coerce their target.  
 
An implied threat solves both problems. If the threat is unofficial will be harder to 
condemn the extortionist, and if it is challenged, you can choose not to pursue it without 
recant and undermine its credibility. For example, in the Magdalena Medio paramilitary 
chief operating as an officer of the Armed Forces during the day while at night 
performing crimes and massacres, sends the following communication between local 
transport companies, "If you do not engage with our company, it is possible that their 
vehicles reach their destination. Who could argue that this message does not contain a 
prescient forecast, and not a deliberate policy?  
 
6. Conclusion  
The central idea that has guided this discussion is that human resources available 
communication mechanisms that are not limited to the point. Much of our life is spent 
in conversations and dialogues, in which the two-way communication flows, jokes, 
teasing or intimidation; various settings in which attitudes we communicate with 
gestures, movements of the hands or feet.  
Schelling gets renewed game theory in a tradition of outstanding scientific ancestry 
(Newman, Nash, Luce, Raiffa) because he dares to develop strategic relationships in 
everyday domains: the raising of children, a hell of rush hour traffic, war cold or a cold 
used as an excuse. A key part of his analysis is to have unlocked the logical structure of 
communication in strategic games. More precisely, the indirect communication 
mechanisms those forms: verbal or nonverbal exchange with long detours or extensions 
often unnecessary.  
Therefore, in direct communication could subjectively predict what someone means, as 
opposed to guess. In cases of bribery, denial ratio hypothesis predicts that indirect 
communication open spaces courtesy to simulate it "was not what I meant." The outputs 
that make the indirect speech act, can keep a relationship reach the jaws of Hell. Under 
situations of tense coexistence, indirect communication can change our relationships 
with others by making the threat is taken as a joke. Everything depends on where the 
emphasis falls of the communicative act. 
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